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COMMENTS
knowledge of the defect, and whether it has or has not adver-
tised its product. Meat packers and canners of fruit and vege-
tables should be considered manufacturers for this purpose. The
distinction between foodstuff in sealed or capped containers and
foodstuff not so contained when a middleman is involved could
be handled by a distinction in the burden of proof. In the former
case the manufacturer should have to prove tampering, whereas
in the latter case, the consumer should be required to prove non-
tampering. In cases where a retailer has labelled foodstuff
manufactured by another as its own, the plaintiff should have a
choice of suing either the retailer or the manufacturer.
Andrew J. S. Jumonville
Status Of Marital Settlements: Gifts Or Bargaining
Transactions
The gift tax section of the Internal Revenue Code provides
that a taxable gift is any complete and irrevocable transfer to
another, whether in trust or otherwise, to the extent that such
transfer is not supported by adequate consideration:
"Where property is transferred for less than an adequate
and full consideration in money or money's worth, then the
amount by which the value of the property exceeds the value
of the consideration shall be deemed a gift."'
In the typical settlement the husband transfers money or prop-
erty in exchange for his wife's relinquishment of marital rights
which have accrued or will accrue.2 Accordingly, the applicabil-
ity of the gift tax to a marital transfer will depend upon whether
the relinquishment of marital rights constitutes adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth.
Income tax is imposed on gain derived from capital, labor
or both combined, and includes profit from the sale or exchange
of capital assets. The applicability of the income tax provisions
is of importance both at the time of the transfer to the wife and
upon the subsequent sale of the property by the wife. If the
1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2512(b).
2. Perhaps there are situations where a wife might transfer property in ex-
change for her husband's marital rights, but for purposes of discussion the typical
situation will be assumed throughout this Comment.
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property transferred to the wife has appreciated in value since
the date of its acquisition by him, the question arises as to
whether he has received a taxable gain on the increase in value
in the amount of the value of the relinquishment by the wife
of her marital rights. The determination of the tax basis of
the property when the wife sells or exchanges it at a later date
presents another area of difficulty. If the wife received the
property as a gift, the Code provides the tax basis shall be the
same as it would be in the hands of the donor or the last
preceding owner by whom it was not acquired by gift.- How-
ever, where the property is received by purchase for adequate
consideration, the tax basis is the fair market value of the con-
sideration given at the time it was acquired.4 Therefore, the
primary issue in determining the tax basis is the classification
of the marital transfer as a gift or purchase for value. It should
be noted that the test of adequate consideration, as utilized in
determining tax basis for income tax purposes, is not analogous
to the test of full consideration in money or money's worth con-
tained in the gift tax provisions of the Code.
GIFT TAX ASPECTS OF MARITAL SETTLEMENTS
Antenuptial Property Agreements
Gift taxes are imposed upon transfers made for less than an
"adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth."'5
It is fairly well settled that transfers of property pursuant to
an antenuptial settlement are not for "adequate and full con-
sideration" and thus are subject to the gift tax.6 The courts
have been unwilling to treat mere detriment to the donee or
the promise of marriage by the donee as satisfying the require-
ment of adequate and full consideration.7
3. If the donor's tax basis is greater than the fair market value of the prop-
erty at the time of the gift, then for the purpose of determining loss upon the sub-
sequent sale of the property the tax basis is the fair market value. INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 1015(b). For the purpose behind Congress requiring that the
donee should accept the donor's basis in computing taxable gain see Report of
Ways and Means Committee No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1927).
4. See note 30 infra and accompanying text.
5. Section 2512(b). See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
6. Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945) ; Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S.
308 (1945).
7. Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945), holding a transfer solely
in consideration of future wife's promise of marriage and to compensate her for
loss of certain trust income which would cease upon her marriage was not con-
sideration in money or money's worth and subject to the gift tax.
(Vol. XXII
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Although some courts have attempted to place a monetary
value on marital rights," the Supreme Court in Merrill v. Fahs,9
held, without deciding that they were not amenable to an evalua-
tion in money, that the relinquishment of such rights was not
adequate and full consideration within the meaning of the gift
tax statute. The court rested its decision on a provision of the
estate tax statute which specifically provides that the surrender
of marital rights is not sufficient consideration for estate tax
purposes. 10 In justifying advertence to the estate tax provisions,
the Court reasoned that for the sake of consistency, the estate
tax and gift tax provisions should be construed in pari nmteria.11
Property Transfers Incident to Separation and Divorce
The question of gift tax liability, where property is trans-
ferred incident to a separation or divorce agreement has, to a
large extent, been settled by the enactment of Section 2516 of
the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, which provides:
"Where husband and wife enter into a written agreement
relative to their marital and property rights and divorce
occurs within 2 years thereafter (whether or not such agree-
ment is approved by the divorce decree), any transfers of
property or interests in property made pursuant to such
agreement -
(1) to either spouse in settlement of his or her marital
or property rights, or
8. The trial court in Merrill v. Fahs, 51 F. Supp. 120 (S.D. Fla. 1943), using
mortality tables, and the value of the property the husband presently owned, com-
puted the wife's marital rights in a fixed sum and refused to sanction the im-
position of the gift tax. The Supreme Court later reversed this holding. See note
10 infra and accompanying text.
9. 324 U.S. 308 (1945).
10. The estate tax statute contains a provision added in 1932 providing that
for purposes of the estate tax "a relinquishment or promised relinquishment of
dower, curtesy, or other marital rights in the decedent's property or estate, shall
not be considered to any extent a consideration in money or money's worth." Int.
Rev. Code of 1932, § 804, now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2043(b). This provision
in the estate tax section was not added to the gift tax section, nor is it present
now.
11. The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, said: "We believe
that there is every reason for giving the same words in the gift tax the same
reading [reference to the estate tax provisions]. To interpret the same phrases in
the two taxes concerning the same subject matter in different ways where obvious
reasons do not compel divergent treatment is to introduce another and needless
complexity into this already irksome situation." 324 U.S. 308, 310 (1945). For a
discussion of the requirement of legislative intervention to correlate and integrate
gift tax and estate tax see Warren, Correlation of Gift and Estate Taxes, 55
HAav. L. REv. 1 (1941) ; Griswold, A Plan for the Coordination of the Income,
Estate and Gift Tax Provisions, 56 HARv. L. IfEv. 337 (1942).
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(2) to provide a reasonable allowance for the support
of issue of the marriage during minority,
shall be deemed to be transfers made for a full and adequate
consideration in money or money's worth.' 12 (Emphasis
added.)
Since the enactment of this provision the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue has indicated that even where a divorce does
not occur within two years from the date of the settlement agree-
ment a transfer incidental to the settlement of dower, curtesy,
or other property rights may, nevertheless, be exempt from the
gift tax if incorporated in a court decree. 13
Prior to the 1954 enactment, the Supreme Court had held
that a property transfer incorporated in a divorce decree was
not subject to the gift tax, the court observing that under such
circumstances the transfer was not merely a private agreement,
but part of the court decree.14 The 1954 enactment modifies
rather than changes the status of the law in this area by re-
moving the requirement of incorporating the agreement in the
divorce decree. It should be noted, however, that transfers to
or for the benefit of major children, or to minor children in
amounts in excess of their support needs, are subject to the
gift tax, whether or not included in a court decree. 15
INCOME TAX ASPECTS OF MARITAL SETTLEMENTS
Income Tax Liability of the Transferring Spouse
Since the transferring spouse must pay a gift tax on all
property transferred incidental to an antenuptial settlement,
the question of income tax liability or any increase in value
of the property since he acquired it does not arise.
Prior to Commissioner v. Marshman0 it was generally be-
lieved that the husband realized taxable income upon the trans-
fer of property that had appreciated in value in exchange for his
wife's surrender of her marital rights, in compliance with a sep-
12. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2516.
13. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2516-1.
14. Commissioner v. Harris, 340 U.S. 106 (1950).
15. Id. at 111. For a further discussion of the gift tax aspects of property
transfers to major children and minors, in excess of their support needs, see
Rosenthal v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1954) ; Karl T. Wiedeman,
26 T.C. 565 (1956).
16. 279 F.2d 27 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 918 (1961).
4561, [Vol. XXlII
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aration or divorce agreement. 17 The Third Circuit, in the case
of Commissioner v. Mesta,'8 held the taxable gain to be the dif-
ference between the fair market value"" of the property at the
date of delivery, and the acquisition cost of the property.
20 It
was stated that, although the value of the wife's rights may be
difficult to ascertain, in the absence of any other value being
shown, the value of the property transferred will be imputed to
the rights relinquished. 2'
The Marshman case involved essentially the same facts as the
Mesta decision. In both instances husbands had transferred
property, which had appreciated in value from the date of acqui-
sition, in exchange for their wives' relinquishment of marital
rights. The Sixth Circuit in Commissioner v. Marshman,22 held
that since marital rights had no ascertainable fair market value
the transaction did not incur income tax liability, although there
is language in the decision which would presumably imply that
the court believed that some economic gain had been received.
The court seems to have required that the fair market value of
the property received must be determinable from factors other
than the value of the property exchanged for it.23
Fair market value is ordinarily defined as the price at which
property would change hands between a willing buyer and a
17. See notes 18 and 20 infra and accompanying text.
18. 123 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 695 (1942). See Com-
missioner v. Halliwell, 131 F. 2d 642 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 741
(1943), holding that a husband received taxable gain when he transferred to his
wife securities that had increased in value in exchange for her rights to share in
his estate and in lieu of alimony and support of their children. For a further
discussion of the realization of income see Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112
(1940).
19. INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 1001(b), while providing that taxable gain is
to be measured by the fair market value of the property received, does not stipu-
late how the fair market value of the property is to be determined.
20. Ibid. provides "that the amount realized from the sale or other disposition
of property is the sum of the money received plus the fair market value of the
property (other than money) received." (Emphasis added.) This is essentially
the same language as existed in the 1939 Internal Revenue Code which was in
effect at the time the Mesta case was decided.
21. The Court reasoned: "We think that we may make the practical assump-
tion that a man who spends money or gives property of a fixed value for an
unliquidated claim is getting his money's worth." Commissioner v. Mesta, 123
F.2d 986, 988 (3d Cir. 1941).
22. 279 F.2d 27, 30 (6th Cir. 1960). The opinion contains language that the
marital rights "may be economic gain but it is not a taxable gain."
23. It is submitted that the language of the Court best exemplifies the ra-
tionale of the opinion. The Court stated that "there is no taxable gain unless
the amount of economic gain is measured in a certain way, and Congress did not
intend or authorize that measurement of taxable gain be made in any other way
than based on fair market value of the property received." (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 30.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell.24
In Mesta the court makes it clear that the marital rights relin-
quished will be evaluated as equivalent to the value of the prop-
erty exchanged therefor by the husband, unless he is able to
prove that the value of the rights is otherwise. 25 In Marshman,
however, the court was unwilling to assume that the rights were
worth what the husband was willing to pay for them, pointing
out that because of the strained emotional atmosphere, the hus-
band may be constrained to pay, not what the rights would be
worth, but the amount he is willing to transfer in order to be
rid of the marriage relationship. Davis v. United States, a de-
cision by the Court of Claims following the Marshman ap-
proach, is presently pending appeal.26
Wife's Tax Obligation Upon Subsequent Alienation of Property
Received in Marital Settlement
The Internal Revenue Code provides that property received
as a gift shall carry the same tax basis as it would have in the
hands of the donor or the last preceding owner by whom it was
not acquired by gift.27 It is definitely established that antenup-
tial property transfers and transfers pursuant to a separation
or divorce agreement, which do not come within the ambit of
Section 2516 are gifts under the gift tax statute.28 Nevertheless,
the Second Circuit in Farid-es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner,29 has
held that in spite of the gift tax provisions, when the property is
in the hands of the wife, her tax basis is to be that of the fair
market value of the property on the date it was transferred to
her under the settlement agreement, and that such transfers are
not characterized as gifts for income tax purposes if adequate
consideration has been given. Thus the anomalous situation
24. See Fitt's Estate v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 729, 731 (8th Cir. 1956)
In re Williams Estate, 256 F.2d 217, 218 (9th Cir. 1958).
25. 123 F.2d 986, 988 (3d Cir. 1941) : "The fair market value of the property
or benefit received by Mesta for the stock may be difficult to ascertain, but in the
absence of any other value being shown we think that it is proper to take fair
market value" of the property transferred.
26. Davis v. United States, 287 F.2d 168 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
27. If the transaction is not deemed to be for adequate consideration (i.e., the
value of the rights relinquished is not equal or above the value of the property
transferred), the basis of the property is governed by provision of the Code relat-
ing to the basis of property acquired by gifts which provides "if the property was
acquired by gift after December 31, 1920, the basis shall be the same as it would
be in the hands of the donor or the last preceding owner by whom it was not
acquired by gift." INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1015(a).
28. See notes 6 through 14 supra and accompanying text.
29. 160 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1947).
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exists that whereas for gift tax purposes, transfers of property
in exchange for marital rights are not considered to be for ade-
quate consideration at the time of the transfer, the transfer is
considered to have been for adequate consideration when the
wife tlater desires to dispose of the property obtained in the set-
tlement. Later cases indicate that where the husband and wife
place a value on the property to be transferred this value will
become the tax basis of that property when the wife sells or ex-
changes it. However, the valuation agreed upon must be based
upon market conditions at or around the time the agreement
is made.80
As a result of Sultaneh and subsequent decisions a wife who
receives property pursuant to a marital settlement enjoys a most
advantageous position from an income tax standpoint. If the
transfer were regarded as a gift, then it is clear that the wife
would hold the property with the same tax basis it had in the
hands of the husband. This being the case, upon divestment of
the property under an onerous arrangement, the wife would re-
ceive taxable income in the amount of the difference between
his tax basis of the property and the consideration which she
obtained at the time of divestment. The tax on the unrealized
appreciation after the acquisition by the husband to the time of
surrender could be substantial. However, under the Sultaneh
treatment of the two transfers, that portion of gain which rep-
resents the appreciation before the property settlement is not
taxable to the wife who receives it in exchange for her marital
rights. Therefore, her monetary gain on the whole transaction
is enhanced by the amount of additional tax which she would
have had to pay if the settlement had involved a donation.
Income Tax Liability for the Enhanced Value of Property Prior
to the Marital Transfer
As a result of the Sultaneh decision any increase in value of
property prior to an antenuptial settlement does not incur in-
come tax liability since the husband must pay a gift tax on the
transfer,3 ' and the wife's tax basis is the fair market value of
30. Commissioner v. Patino, 186 F.2d 962 (4th Cir. 1950) (giving shares of
stock a tax basis as agreed upon by the parties at the time of settlement) ; Edina
W. Gardner Trust, 20 T.C. 885 (1953) (where stock was transferred into a trust
created for the benefit of the wife at an agreed value at the time of transfer that
value was permitted as the trust's basis) ; Aleda N. Hall, 9 T.C. 53 (1947)
(where both spouses had agreed to evaluate stock by market conditions over the
last few months this value was allowed as the tax basis).
31. See notes 7, 8, and 9 aupra and accompanying text.
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the property at the time she receives it.32 Furthermore, if the
reasoning of the Marshman decision is followed in the Davis
case, property that has appreciated in value prior to a separa-
tion or divorce settlement will also avoid income taxation.
33
To a large extent this gap in our income tax structure can be
attributed to the utilization of dual tests in determining what is
a gift for gift tax purposes and a gift for the establishment of
the tax basis of property in the hands of the wife.
It would seem that a partial solution to this problem would
be for Congress to integrate the provisions of the estate, gift and
income tax sections of the Internal Revenue Code, whereby the
classification of a property transfer as a gift for gift tax pur-
poses would automatically cause the wife to receive the property
with the same tax basis as her husband. It is suggested that
this would be a possible solution in the antenuptial settlement
area.
However, the problem raised in the Mesta and Marshman
type situation would not be solved by the employment of a con-
sistent classification. Perhaps the most realistic approach to the
measuring of taxable income to the husband is exemplified by
the reasoning of the court in Mesta. There seems little doubt
that the husband receives economic gain by the relinquishment
of marital rights. Moreover, it would be unrealistic to conclude
that the wife received such property as a gift, since she relin-
quishes valuable rights in exchange for the property. Since the
husband is the only one who benefits from this increased value,
it is suggested that the Mesta approach should be followed and
fair market value of the property be attributed to the rights
relinquished, unless established otherwise by the husband.
Conclusion
In deciding cases involving the gift tax aspects of antenup-
tial property settlements the Supreme Court has formulated
precise rules of law, whereby all transfers of property in ex-
change for the relinquishment of marital rights are subject to
the gift tax. Moreover, in most cases involving separation or
divorce settlements Congress has removed gift tax liability.
When the wife later sells or exchanges property received in
32. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
33. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
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accordance with a marital settlement her tax basis is the fair
market value of the property at the time she acquired it. In the
area of income tax liability the only unresolved area of the law
is the income tax consequences to the husband of property set-
tlements involving property that has increased in value from the
time of its acquisition. The pending decision in the Davis case
could settle the hiatus in this area. However, it is submitted
that congressional action will be required to alleviate the present
tax void in antenuptial property settlements.
D. Mark Bienvenu
Damages For Pain And Suffering - - The Propriety Of
Per Diem Arguments
It is now generally recognized that pain and suffering are
proper elements to be considered in determining damages in a
personal injury suit.' When attempting to award these damages
the difficult problem of determining what is a fair and adequate
award immediately presents itself. There is no way to evaluate
the losses caused solely by pain and suffering in monetary terms
owing to the impossibility of making a third person exactly
aware of the extent and nature of this damage. In recognition
of this fact, it has been stated that the enlightened conscience
of the jury is the only permissible guide, 2 and that the ultimate
test is that of the reasonableness of the award.3 But in actuality,
the standard of reasonableness is of only limited assistance to
a juror attempting to arrive at a proper award. He is still left
relatively uninformed and may be skeptical of his ability to cor-
1. Physical pain and suffering: Lacy v. Lucky, 19 La. App. 743, 140 So. 857
(1932) ; Nevala v. City of Ironwood, 232 Mich. 316, 205 N.W. 93 (1925) ; Nash-
ville v. Brown, 25 Tenn. App. 340, 157 S.W.2d 612 (1942). Mental pain and
suffering: Crawford v. Zurich General Accident and Liability Ins. Co., 42 So.2d
553 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1949) ; Continental Optical Co. v. Reed, 119 Ind. App. 643,
86 N.E.2d 306 (1949). Future pain and suffering: Shuck v. Keefe, 205 Iowa
375, 218 N.W. 31 (1928) ; City of Richmond v. Hill, 195 Ky. 566, 242 S.W. 867
(1922).
2. See Braddock v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 80 So.2d 662, 667 (Fla. 1955).
In states such as Louisiana where juries are seldom used in civil cases, the judge
will of course serve the same function as the jury normally would if used. How-
ever, this Note deals primarily with the damage problem as it concerns the jury.
The problem in Louisiana is dealt with in note 17 infra.
3. See Braddock v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 80 So.2d 662, 666 (Fla. 1955)
Faught v. Washam, 329 S.W.2d 588, 602 (Mo. 1959); Affett v. Milwaukee &
Suburban Transport Corp., 11 Wis.2d 604, 609, 106 N.W.2d 274, 277 (1960).
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